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Desegregation and the Supreme Court:
The Fatal Attraction of Brown
By DONALD E. LIvELY*
Introduction
The desegregation era has been notable for exceptional demands and
disappointing results. The desegregation mandate, as introduced by
Brown v. Board of Education,1 deviated from principles of constitutional
review that had routinely accommodated or deferred to classifications
and distinctions on the basis of race.2 Recent Supreme Court decisions
have, however, trimmed constitutional requirements for a society that
has left behind formal segregation, but not realities of racism and dis-
crimination. As ultimately defined, the law of the land is that the
achievements of Brown need not be preserved3 and the undoing of segre-
gation itself is required only "to the extent practicable." 4
Investment in the desegregation mandate for less than four decades
contrasts with the use of the separate but equal doctrine for half of the
Fourteenth Amendment's existence. The result is consistent, however,
with two centuries of constitutional jurisprudence that belatedly re-
sponded to issues of race, and has since consistently qualified and nar-
rowed the principles that would reckon with discrimination and its
legacy. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery,5 which northern
states had accommodated as a cost of establishing a viable union.6 When
southern states attempted to reintroduce slavery in function rather than
* Professor, College of Law, The University of Toledo. J.D., University of California,
Los Angeles; M.S., Northwestern University; A.B., University of California, Berkeley.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. at 495.
3. See infra notes 83-113 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
6. The hard bargaining of Georgia and South Carolina with northern states, which may
have objected to slavery but nonetheless considered concessions essential to create a union, is
discussed in DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED Sco'rr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERI-
CAN LAW AND POLITICS 2-27 (1978).
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form immediately after the Thirteenth Amendment's enactment,7 the
Fourteenth Amendment was framed and ratified to secure the citizenship
of all persons born or naturalized in the United States, including those of
African descent'. It also established privileges and immunities incidental
to national citizenship and prohibited states from denying to any person
due process or equal protection of the law.9 For nearly a century, judi-
cial review of the Fourteenth Amendment was notable for its deference
to official schemes and policies that favored whites and burdened other
racial groups.10
The recharting of equal protection principles in 1954 was thus per-
formed against a backdrop of profound racial prejudice and discrimina-
tion. As central features in the nation's traditions, these were potent
factors that could not be erased by a single judicial decree or series
thereof. To the extent that racism survived the recasting of legal princi-
ple, it presented a persistent risk of diluting or defeating any constitu-
tional commitment toward reckoning with the nation's legacy of racial
injustice. The danger was compounded by the possibility that fatigue,
indifference, or impatience with the intractable problem of race might set
in and undermine grand objectives in much the same way that fading
interest sapped motivation to achieve the goals of the Civil War amend-
ments in the post-Reconstruction period.11
The desegregation mandate's devitalization, despite the reality that
racially identifiable and unequal schools endure as pervasive rather than
exceptional phenomena, suggests the possibility that history has repeated
itself. It invites attention not only to the wisdom of ending the era but to
the decision to commence it. Desegregation essentially has been an af-
firmative action policy that in significant ways has failed and, absent evi-
dence that society was reasonably likely to adhere to its requirements
in a comprehensive and enduring way, may have been a misplaced
investment.
7. In response to the Thirteenth Amendment, many southern states immediately enacted
the Black Codes, which imposed extensive restraints upon blacks and established race-depen-
dent systems of civil and criminal law.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 14, 79-89 and accompanying text.
11. After a flurry of congressional activity in the late 1860s and early 1870s, Congress
ceased generating significant civil rights legislation for nearly a century. The Supreme Court
from the late 19th century to the middle of the 20th century also narrowed the scope of the
federal interest in civil rights and deferred to state action that formally classified on the basis of
race. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding Congress may only reach state
action in legislating under Fourteenth Amendment); see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896) (holding racial segregation in rail accommodations a reasonable exercise of police
power).
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The Brown decision displaced the separate but equal doctrine that
had defined racial jurisprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment since
the late nineteenth century. Although the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments respectively had prohibited slavery12 and established citi-
zenship and its incidents for a new class of citizens, 13 it was not until
1954 that the racist ideology of pro-slavery jurisprudence was fully repu-
diated. 4 The Brown Court determined that officially segregated educa-
tion connoted racial inferiority.15 Equally significant for purposes of
establishing a Fourteenth Amendment violation was the determination
that enforced separation denied equal educational opportunity. 16 Elimi-
nation of official segregation was apt, overdue, and an indubitable
achievement of the desegregation mandate. The Brown decision rede-
fined the Fourteenth Amendment and, in so doing, prohibited what the
Framers themselves had countenanced. It also reinvigorated the fed-
eral interest in civil rights and equality that had inspired the Fourteenth
Amendment, and had largely been suppressed by subsequent glosses.1 8
12. As the first of the reconstruction amendments, the Thirteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII.
13. The Fourteenth Amendment responded primarily to the Black Codes and harassment
of unionists in the immediate postbellum South. The Codes, by comprehensively limiting the
liberty and rights of blacks, maintained the functional equivalent of slavery. The origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment are detailed in 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1888 (1978); HAR-
OLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW (1982).
14. The post-war amendments overturned Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1856), in form. Official discrimination and segregation reflecting premises of white superior-
ity, however, were upheld until the Court invalidated prescriptive racial separation in public
schools in Brown. See, eg., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (establishing the "separate
but equal" doctrine that survived until 1954), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (denying Congress the power
to prohibit "mere discriminations" by private persons and entities and accommodating soci-
ety's traditional race-dependent distribution of privileges).
15. Brown at 494 ("[The policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting
the inferiority of the negro group.").
16. Id. ("[S]egregation with the sanction of law ... has a tendency to [retard] the educa-
tional and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits
they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.") (alterations in original).
17. Congress generated the Fourteenth Amendment for ratification while contemporane-
ously providing for racial segregation of public schools in the District of Columbia. See DON-
ALD E. LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION AND RACE 47 (1992).
18. Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment represented a redistribution of federal and
state interests in citizenship and its incidents. Prior to the amendment's constitutional en-
shrinement, citizenship was a status conferred by states which also determined the nature and
scope of rights and liberties. The Fourteenth Amendment established a national interest in
freedom and equality and authorized Congress to secure those interests against racially dis-
criminatory action by the states. In theory, the amendment rolled back a previous ruling that
regarded constitutional rights as a check only upon federal power. See Barron v. Mayor of
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Widespread resistance toward the implementation of desegregation
delayed meaningful progress. 19" The process eventually was advanced
by congressional enactments enabling the Justice Department to bring
desegregation actions and denying federal funds to school districts not
complying with the requirements of Brown.2' By the late 1960s, as the
desegregation process threatened to reach the North and West, public
and judicial enthusiasm for the mandate began to wane.2' The Court
was also recast with personnel less amenable to vigorous equal protection
remedies.22 Within two decades of Brown, the Court qualified the deseg-
regation mandate so that it did not reach so-called de facto segregation,23
generally could not implicate predominantly white suburbs,24 and did
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833). In practice, however, the federal interest would
later be checked by jurisprudence that perceived the threat of federal power being used "to
create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights." The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (denying Congress power to prohibit segregation in various public
venues).
19. The decade following Brown was characterized by widespread resistance, evasion, and
delay. For examples of subterfuges or inactions that maintained segregation as a function of
custom rather than official dictate, see Wright v. City Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972)
(invalidating subdivision of school district calculated to insulate white community from consti-
tutional demands); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (striking down freedom of
choice plan that failed to effect dismantling of dual school system); Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S.
198 (1965) (rejecting desegregation of one grade per year as insufficient to satisfy Fourteenth
Amendment demands); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (finding that closure of
public schools was prompted solely to avoid desegregation).
20. See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6(d) (prohibiting discrimi-
nation in public schools).
21. See LIVELY, supra note 17, at 118-120.
22. During the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon promised to appoint Supreme
Court justices who would animate the equal protection guarantee less vigorously. See LouIs
M. KOHLMEYER, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 114 (1972); THEODORE H. WHITE,
THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT-1968 396 (1969). Nixon's appointment of Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist proved critical to the unwinding of the
desegregation mandate in the 1970s. See infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text. Justice
Blackmun eventually subscribed to what became the minority position that desegregation re-
sponsibilities should not end until they are "fully completed and maintained so that the stig-
matic harm identified in Brown I, will not recur." Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630,
647 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even so, Justice Blackmun joined the Court's unanimous
conclusion a year later that desegregation was necessary "to the extent practicable" and not as
a permanent requirement. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1446 (1992) (quoting Dowell, 111
S. Ct. at 638).
23. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973) (holding segregation not
attributable to official action is constitutionally insignificant), discussed infra notes 59-65 and
accompanying text.
24. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that metropolitan desegregation
remedy exceeds scope of harm because suburban school districts had not contributed to urban
segregation and had not manipulated district lines in race-dependent fashion), discussed infra
notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
THE FATAL ATTRACTION OF BROWN
not necessarily impose lasting responsibilities. 25 Compounded by the de-
termination that education was not a fundamental right,26 the desegrega-
tion mandate became an ever diminishing source of constitutional
returns. It had defeated formal segregation but ultimately accommo-
dated functional or reconstituted racial separation. Education itself re-
mained characterized by segregation and inequality.27 At its height, the
desegregation mandate demanded elimination of segregation "root and
branch."2 Its actual legacy is much less, insofar as equal protection
standards have been adjusted to require only the pruning of overt mani-
festations of discrimination. The objective of eradicating segregation
"root and branch" has been scaled down by contemporary case law,
which now requires desegregation "to the extent practicable" and de-
scribes "the ultimate objective" of remediation as "returning school dis-
tricts to the control of local authorities.
29
The Brown decision radically redirected equal protection doctrine
and required extensive cultural upheaval, but was premised upon as-
sumptions that eventually limited its achievements. Given the backdrop
against which Brown emerged, and the manifestly racist tradition that it
repudiated, the Brown decision has presented a unique challenge to crit-
ics. To question the quality of its calculus runs a risk of being typed as
racist or reactionary. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Brown decision has
been treated with deference even by some of its most logical critics.
Although not grounded in interpretive norms ordinarily acceptable to
exponents of judicial restraint and political conservativism, 30 Brown
nonetheless is a decision they strive to rationalize and accept. Robert
Bork, an ardent advocate of originalism, has noted the deviation between
the desegregation principle and the Framers' acceptance of formal racial
separation.31 Still, he has embraced the Brown ruling as the necessary
function of a choice between revising the meaning of equal protection or
effectively reading it out of the Constitution.32 Justice Scalia has identi-
25. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (finding no further
duty to desegregate unless resegregation is a function of official design), discussed infra notes
71-75 and accompanying text.
26. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-37 (1973).
27. See id. See also Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1437-48 (1992); Dowell v. Board of
Educ., 111 S. Ct. 630, 635-37 (1991).
28. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
29. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445.
30. The decision is at odds with original thinking that did not contemplate racially mixed
education, as evidenced by contemporaneous provision for segregation of education in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
31. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 82-83 (1990).
32. See id.
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fled desegregation as an exception to his otherwise unbending view that
race-conscious policies are constitutionally unacceptable.33 Such efforts
at accommodation are mystifying in some ways, revealing in others, and
ultimately as unconvincing as they are disproportionate to the signifi-
cance of Brown as it has devolved. The inclination to except Brown from
interpretive norms suggests theoretical maneuvers that are more patron-
izing than honest. The abiding effort to square doctrine with incompati-
ble theories of judicial restraint, especially as the desegregation principle
itself has been gutted, indicates analytical confusion, selective distortion
prompted by concern for appearance, and perhaps an unconscious con-
cession to the rightness of a result that if fully acknowledged would un-
dermine a favored judicial theory or political agenda.
Given the historical significance of race and impediments to the
elimination of racial distinctions, the desegregation formula, if not
programmed for failure, was at least a high risk proposition. It has been
noted that, especially in the South, official segregation was not merely a
means of separation, but involved "one in-group enjoying full normal
communal life and one out-group that is barred from this life and forced
into an inferior life of its own."34 Repudiation of such a system was
appropriate, and a compelling justification existed for policies that would
repair a legacy of accumulated group disadvantage. The provision for
relief "with all deliberate speed,"35 rather than demanding immediate
compliance, signaled judicial equivocation that eventually would under-
mine the realization of Brown's full potential. Inadequate or incomplete
enforcement also illuminated an unfortunate overemphasis upon assimi-
lation as the sole path to destigmatization. Such an emphasis disre-
garded the more profound reality that stigmatic harm ultimately is
traceable to racial assumptions that were capable of surviving the system
of formal, legal segregation. Because racial prejudice could not reason-
ably have been expected to dissipate by virtue of constitutional reformu-
lation alone, a major risk to the fulfillment of Brown's promise was that
doctrine would freeze as discriminatory methodologies changed from
overt to subtle and resistance to change was compounded by indifference.
The risk has materialized into reality, as standards have not developed
beyond the point of reckoning with formal segregation or discrimination.
33. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing constitutional color-blindness is a fixed rule except when "necessary to
eliminate maintenance ... of a system of unlawful racial classification" or in the event of a
"social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb").
34. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
425 (1960).
35. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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The remedial methodology of desegregation itself, moreover, may actu-
ally have enhanced stigmatic injury to the extent that it tied perceptions
of personal or group adequacy to full acceptance by a society resistant to
comprehensive integration. Compounding the negative fallout from
Brown have been reduced desegregative demands and a failure to account
effectively for educational opportunity.
This article will examine the original assumptions of the Brown
Court and possibilities for meaningful change as a function of revised
Fourteenth Amendment criteria; identify how contemporary case law ef-
fectively has foreclosed the desegregation era; and consider why the de-
segregation principle in significant part has been a constitutional failure.
I. The Rise and Fall of the Desegregation Principle
The desegregation mandate consummated a two-decade long litiga-
tive effort to defeat official segregation.36 As described by Thurgood
Marshall, who helped direct the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People's litigative strategy against segregation, the chal-
lenge was calculated first to contest unequal funding and ultimately to
demonstrate that separate facilities were inherently unequal.37 From the
NAACP's initial attack on official segregation came progress toward ac-
tualizing the long-neglected second prong of the separate but equal doc-
trine. Beginning in the mid-1930s, federal and state courts required
states to equalize public education at the graduate and professional
levels.3" Insofar as states did not provide separate higher education to
black students, they were obligated to admit them to previously all-white
schools.39 Initial pressure to desegregate thus was exerted not by de-
manding an end to separation, but rather by insisting on the premise of
equality. Direct and comprehensive dismantling of official segregation
would not be achieved for another generation.
36. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) sought
to challenge official segregation at what was perceived to be its most vulnerable point. The
initial focus thus was upon graduate and professional education, where the persons affected
were relatively few and mature. It was calculated that if segregation could be defeated at the
highest academic levels, the entire system of racial separation eventually would unwind. The
NAACP's strategy is discussed in KENNETH F. RIPPLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 121-
36 (1984); see also Thurgood Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to Achieve Racial Inte-
gration in Education through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. NEGRO EDUC. 316 (1952).
37. Marshall, supra note 36, at 318.
38. Initial court rulings required states to provide legal education to black students, rather
than subsidize their enrollment out of state, and if necessary, to integrate public law schools.
See Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590
(Md. 1936).
39. Gaines, 305 U.S. at 352; Pearson, 182 A. at 594.
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When conceived and as pursued, the aim of undoing segregation was
not consensually subscribed to even among critics of the established or-
der. W.E.B. DuBois noted, contemporaneously with the NAACP's ini-
tial success, that "[o]ther things being equal" desegregated schools were
the ideal, but "things seldom are equal, and in that case, Sympathy,
Knowledge, and the Truth, outweigh all the mixed school can offer."'
The pertinence of DuBois's observation was renewed in the post-Brown
era as desegregation evolved in the direction of formal equality, without
concern for equal educational opportunity, in a still largely segregated
environment.4' The Court in Brown determined that racially segregated
public schools never could be equal for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.42 Implicit in that conclusion and corresponding doctrinal
revision was the sense that equal opportunity would be secured and con-
notations of racial inferiority would vanish through desegregation. Con-
stitutional redirection was premised, however, upon dubious assumptions
about the past and risky calculations of the future.
Having requested and heard reargument on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's original intent, the Brown Court concluded that the Framers' pur-
pose was uncertain.43 That determination is at least questionable
because, notwithstanding the usual difficulties in discerning official mo-
tive,' the Framers' aims and premises were not especially obscure.
Although generating the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress also had
provided for segregated schools in the District of Columbia.4" The rati-
fying states, moreover, included some that had prohibited education of
blacks and others that allowed it only on a segregated basis.4 6
The original contemplations of the Fourteenth Amendment's archi-
tects have been a persisting challenge to exponents of judicial restraint,
who strive to reconcile Brown with their theories of review.47 Insofar as
40. W.E.B. Dubois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUc. 328, 335
(1935).
41. The internalization of discriminatory attitudes and presumptions and their manifesta-
tion in the form of tracking, discipline, and teacher expectations in desegregated settings are
discussed in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972) (en
bane).
42. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
43. Id. at 490 (noting "little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its
intended effect on public education").
44. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
46. Ohio and Massachusetts, for instance, had segregated educational systems that sur-
vived litigative challenges. See State ex rel. Gaines v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1872); Rob-
erts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
47. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. Herbert Wechsler, a few years after
Brown, criticized the decision for deviating from principles of constitutional neutrality. Her-
the Brown decision is driven by a revised understanding that repudiates
original segregative expectations, such efforts at accommodation are fu-
tile. They also stretch logic needlessly beyond the plausible sense that
public education over the course of time had become critically tied to
original concern with basic opportunity for self-development." The de-
termination that the Amendment's history was uncertain, especially after
postponement of a decision for a full term to hear arguments on that
particular question, 9 weakened the Court's logic. Without an honest
historical accounting, education had become connected to the Four-
teenth Amendment in a way never contemplated by the Framers.5 0
By encouraging affected states to participate in the framing of relief
and vesting state and local officials and lower courts with implementation
and oversight responsibilities, the Court anticipated cooperation in the
transition from dual to unitary schools. 1 Expectations of acquiescence
were confounded initially by resistance to and evasion of the mandate.5 2
The efficacy of the Brown principle ultimately would depend upon the
Court's ability to have it enforced. In one notable instance, desegrega-
tion was accomplished by armed intervention. 3 It was boosted further
by federal legislation authorizing the United States Attorney General to
bring desegregation actions and denying federal funding to school dis-
bert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 26
(1959). Although objecting to the premises of Brown, Weehsler nonetheless was hopeful that a
principled basis could be discovered for it that would square with acceptable interpretive his-
tory. See id.
48. The Fourteenth Amendment in large part constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of
1866, which stressed basic guarantees for self-development such as contractual liberty, prop-
erty rights, freedom to travel, and equal treatment under the law. See LIVELY, supra note 17,
at 45-47. Neither education generally, nor its racially mixed nature, figured as a basic right or
interest. Id. at 47. Compare withBrown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("[1]t
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education.").
49. Brown v. Board of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (requesting reargument focused partic-
ularly upon Framers' understanding and judicial power to abolish segregation).
50. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
51. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955) (local courts relied upon
to take advantage of their "proximity to local conditions" and ensure compliance with desegre-
gation mandate being effected in "good faith"). Dual and unitary terminology has been used
by the Court to describe formally segregated and nondiscriminatory school systems respec-
tively. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435-36 (1968).
52. The history of southern intransigence is detailed in NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., POLIT-
ICAL AND CIVIL RIGrrrs IN TIE UNITED STATES 701-09 (4th ed. 1979).
53. The governor of Arkansas attempted to enforce a state law declaring desegregation
unconstitutional. Resistance ultimately was overcome by resort to federal troops and an order
denying the school board any delay in implementing a desegregation plan. See Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
THE FATAL ATTRACTON OF BROWN
Snrinix 19931
SDrln 1993]
658 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY (Vol. 20:649
tricts not complying with Brown.54
Efforts to avoid the process persisted throughout the desegregation
era. After more than a decade of intransigence and evasion by many
school districts, the Court insisted upon desegregation remedies that
"promise[ ] realistically to work now." 5  By then, however, the changes
contemplated by the Brown Court had eluded nearly an entire generation
of public school students. One school system subject to the original de-
segregation order in Brown itself remained unchanged a decade after the
decision.56 At the same time, barely two percent of southern black stu-
dents attended schools where they did not constitute the dominant racial
group.
57
Unresponsiveness to Brown was reminiscent of early reaction to the
Fourteenth Amendment itself. Although the Amendment reflected a
new federal interest in civil rights and equality and provided a tool for
attacking state devices for denying or limiting basic rights and equality,
the Amendment's initial agenda was weakened by competing priorities
and continued resistance to change. As reunification and economic de-
velopment became more pressing, the nation's commitment to civil rights
and societal change lapsed. 58 Similarly, after several years of judicial and
legislative activity on behalf of civil rights, the Court began to trim the
scope of the Brown mandate.
The Supreme Court enunciated the first significant qualification in
Keyes v. School District No. 1.59 Unlike the South, where segregation was
maintained by legal prescription, the North and West achieved similar
results through official decisions with respect to district lines, school sit-
ing, pupil placement, and other race-dependent variables.6" In Keyes,
the Court determined that such policy-making "establishe[d] a prima fa-
cie case of intentional segregation."61 Of particular long-term signifi-
cance was the Court's illusory distinction between de jure and de facto
54. The Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000e-2(j) (prohibiting discrimi-
nation by public schools and by programs receiving federal funding).
55. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
56. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 863 (5th Cir. 1966),
affid, 380 F.2d 385 (en bane), cert denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
57. BUREAU oF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. oF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT oF
THE UNITED STATES 124 (95th ed. 1974).
58. See LIVELY, supra note 17, at 74-84.
59. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
60. The nature of school segregation in the North is discussed in GUNNER MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 621 (1944); Frank
I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF.
L. Rnv. 275 (1972).
61. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213.
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segregation,62 and its determination that only the former was constitu-
tionally objectionable.63 Since Keyes required courts to discern de jure
segregation before ordering desegregation, it became the plaintiff's re-
sponsibility to demonstrate that racial separation was attributable to in-
tentional official action.' 4 The finding of a constitutional violation in
Keyes itself may have suggested that its analytical framework could be
used to support demands for desegregation. In fact, as motive-referenced
standards have evolved in response to challenged policies by schools and
other public institutions, the Keyes requirement of official action has
proved effective primarily in curtailing the Fourteenth Amendment's
demands.65
Further qualifying the demands of the desegregation mandate was
the Court's determination, one year after Keyes, that interdistrict relief
was not a remedial option. In Milliken v. Bradley,66 it rejected the trial
court's findings that state involvement in the segregation of Detroit
schools justified a desegregation plan comprehending the city and its sub-
urbs.67 The Court emphasized that suburban communities had not col-
luded directly with the city for segregative purposes and,
notwithstanding their common status with the city as subdivisions of the
state, were immune from responsibility for fixing any constitutional vio-
lation.68 As a consequence of the Milliken decision, the phenomenon of
62. School segregation in many communities descends from a history that includes offi-
cially enforced restrictive covenants, federal lending policies that denied home loans that
would lead to racially mixed neighborhoods, school construction policies, public housing siting
and distribution of urban development funds. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 216 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring); PAUL JACOBS, PRELUDE TO RIOT: A ViEw OF URBAN AMERICA FROM THE BOTTOM
139-41 (1967).
63. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
64. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 207-08 (asserting plaintiff's obligation to establish prima facie
case of segregative intent which state has opportunity to rebut).
65. Because discriminatory purpose may be concealed, subtle, or unconscious, efforts to
identify it tend to be futile. By establishing motive-referenced standards and rejecting the
significance of statistical disparities, the Court has limited the possibility of proving racial
discrimination against minorities. See, eg., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1986). In
the past decade, the Court has identified only a few instances in which standards of proof were
satisfied. See, eg., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1987) (holding a prosecutor may not use
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S.
222 (1985) (invalidating state criminal law enacted for patently discriminatory reasons); Wash-
ington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding redistribution of power to require
busing constitutionally impermissible).
66. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
67. The district court had determined that the state had facilitated segregation in Detroit
by nullifying a voluntary segregation plan, overseeing segregative construction policies, imple-
menting a transportation plan that was racially steered, and sanctioning race-dependent at-
tendance plans. See id. at 734-35 n.16; id. at 770-71 (White, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 746-47.
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white flight received constitutional blessing. Justice Marshall objected
that the Court was abandoning its responsibility for the consequences of
the desegregation command which it had entered two decades earlier.69
He perceived in the decision a sense that the desegregation process
"ha[d] gone far enough."
'70
The Milliken decision established geographical restrictions upon the
desegregation mandate. In Pasadena City Board of Education v. Span-
gler,7 ' the Court emphasized that desegregation responsibilities also were
subject to time limitation.72 Specifically, the Court concluded that once a
racially neutral attendance pattern was implemented, further constitu-
tional duties would not be imposed in response to demographic change."
Barring proof of official contribution to or manipulation of racial compo-
sition, therefore, resegregation was not a basis for further remediation.74
Justice Marshall argued unsuccessfully that when a state has "created a
system where whites and Negroes were intentionally kept apart so that
they could not become accustomed to learning together, [it] is responsi-
ble for the fact that many whites will react to the dismantling of that
segregated system by attempting to flee to the suburbs." 75 By the 1970s,
the desegregation principle had been redefined to the point that it func-
tioned only in rare instances where official wrong was manifest, afforded
few meaningful remedies in major urban centers, and became only a
passing obligation.
The principles enunciated in Keyes, Milliken, and Spangler pro-
foundly limited the prospective operation of the desegregation mandate.
They also generated obvious questions with respect to whether the ac-
complishments of the Brown mandate could be preserved and whether
any constitutional obligation existed to maintain them. Integration
maintenance efforts in some cities have led to sometimes incongruous
and unsettling results. One city, for instance, reverted to racially identifi-
able schools at the primary level in hopes of preserving integration at the
69. Id. at 806 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 814 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
72. See id. at 436-39 (finding that desegregation remedies not intended to be permanent).
73. See id. (holding that school boards, "having once implemented a racially neutral at-
tendance pattern," have no further obligation to remediate absent evidence of official resegre-
gative intent).
74. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32, reh'g denied, 403
U.S. 912 (1971) (finding no further constitutional responsibility necessary absent "showing
that ... State has deliberately attempted to... affect the racial composition of the schools").
75. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 806 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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secondary level.76 Another restricted transfers from minority dominated
schools to integrated settings out of concern that white flight would be
exacerbated." Such policies have responded to abiding difficulties in ac-
tualizing the goals of Brown and desegregation itself. So elusive did the
aims of Brown become that preservation of the process was prioritized
above and to the detriment of the opportunity it was intended to secure.
Recent case law has emphasized that such "heroic efforts" are not obliga-
tory,78 and effectively has reduced desegregation to a ritual that must be
performed to render segregation constitutionally permissible.
H. Reversion to Constitutional Norms
A persistent aspect of relevant constitutional review has been the
misperception of racial reality, or manipulation of it, to avoid constitu-
tional strictures. Such analytical failure is a phenomenon that precedes
and postdates the Brown decision. The Supreme Court upheld slavery
and denied citizenship status to all persons of African descent, for in-
stance, in the belief that they were "beings of an inferior order and alto-
gether unfit to associate with the white race.., and lawfully... reduced
to slavery."79 Even after the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and
ratified, the Court regarded exclusion of blacks from public accommoda-
tions and reservation of social privileges for whites as "mere discrimina-
tions."80 The separate but equal doctrine advanced a premise that any
harm from official segregation was attributable not to the law itself but to
the construction that "the colored race chooses to put.., on it.""1 Such
rationalization was a jurisprudentially polished veneer upon a policy that
was the cornerstone of white supremacy, which assumed that "blacks
were inherently inferior... , a conviction being stridently trumpeted by
white supremacists from the press, the pulpit, and the platform, as well
as the legislative halls of the South." 2
The Brown Court eventually recognized that prescriptive separation
on the basis of race was a constitutionally significant source of stigma-
76. See Riddick v. School Bd., 627 F. Supp. 814, 818 (E.D. Va. 1984), affid 784 F.2d 521
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
77. See Parent Ass'n v. Ambach, 738 F.2d 574, 576 (2d Cir. 1984).
78. Freeman v. Pitts, II S. Ct. 1430, 1447 (1992).
79. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
80. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (holding that denial of certain privileges
to blacks, such as access to public accommodations, not significant enough to merit congres-
sional attention pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment).
81. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
82. Leonard W. Levy, Plessy v. Ferguson, in CIVIL RIGHTS AND EQUALITY 174 (Kenneth
L. Karst ed., 1989).
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tizing injury and an impediment to opportunity.8 3 Consistent with, and
perhaps a reason for, the desegregation mandate's demise, however, has
been a reversion to traditional perceptual norms. Refusal to recalibrate
the desegregation principle so that it would account for demographic
change, for instance, reflects a perception of population redistribution as
a "quite normal pattern of human migration."81 4 This dismissal of any
constitutional significance with respect to population resettlement follow-
ing court-ordered desegregation is reminiscent of the Plessy Court's def-
erence to distinctions "in the nature of things." 5 Similarly evidencing a
sense of invariability, and thus acceptability, is the view that "[e]ven if
the Constitution required it, and it were possible for the federal courts to
do it, no equitable decree can fashion an 'Emerald City' where all the
races, ethnic groups, and persons of various income levels live side by
side.... "I6 Such a perception is akin to the denial of relief for racially
motivated deprivation of voting rights at the turn of this century because,
given dominant attitudes of the time and place, judicial intervention
would be "pointless."8 "
The limiting principles which diminished the operation and signifi-
cance of the desegregation mandate suggested that Brown itself was an
exception to perceptual and analytical norms. Constrictive as they were,
the decisions of the 1970s did not entirely enervate the desegregation
principle. Even after those rulings, the Court found constitutional viola-
tions in the school systems of two northern cities 8 and struck down an
antibusing initiative in a northern state.8 9 Recent decisions have effec-
tively relegated desegregation to a historical episode which now is largely
past.
In Board of Education v. Dowell,9" the Court emphasized that deseg-
regation decrees are not supposed to operate in perpetuity and should be
dissolved when local authorities have complied "with the commands of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and ... it
was unlikely that the school board would return to its former ways."9
The Court thus rejected a standard that would have maintained judicial
83. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (analyzing official segregation as
"denoting the inferiority of the Negro Group").
84. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976).
85. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
86. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Reed, 445 U.S. 935, 938 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 482 (1903).
88. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brink-
man, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
89. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
90. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
91. Id. at 636-37.
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supervision, barring a showing of "grievous wrong evoked by new and
unforeseen conditions."' 92 It expressed the sense, moreover, that federal
oversight was permissible only so long as necessary to aid in transition to
a unitary system.93 Once that end was realized, and schools had oper-
ated in compliance with the desegregation decree for a reasonable length
of time, the Court determined that total authority should revert to local
officials.94
As explained by the majority in Dowell, the school board responded
to demographic change by adopting a student reassignment plan antici-
pating neighborhood schools through fourth grade beginning in 1985-
thirteen years after the desegregation decree was entered and eight years
after it was lifted. 95 The new policy contemplated that half of the schools
would be racially mixed and the other half more than ninety per cent
black or white.96 The reemergence of racially identifiable schools, pursu-
ant to official action, prompted arguments that the district court should
reassert jurisdiction.97 The Supreme Court, however, remanded the case
for a determination of whether the school board "had complied in good
faith with the desegregation decree.., and whether the vestiges of past
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable."9'
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, criti-
cized the majority for downplaying the reality and constitutional signifi-
cance of the circumstances. For the dissenters, the case arose in a
historical context of "nearly unflagging resistance by the Board to judi-
cial efforts to dismantle the City's dual educational system." 99 Not only
had Oklahoma required segregation since it became a state in 19 0 7,1°"
but its response to the Brown decision had been evasive and unrespon-
sive. Even after a desegregation action was commenced against the
school board in 1961, its policy was calculated to fortify rather than de-
feat segregation. 10 1 School siting decisions and attendance zones, for in-
stance, reinforced patterns of residential segregation that had once been
92. Id. at 636 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)).
93. Id. at 637 (finding federal supervision of local schools is temporary measure pending
transition to system free of racial discrimination).
94. Id. (emphasizing interest in reverting to local control of schools).
95. See id. at 633-34.
96. Id. at 634.
97. See id. at 633-34.
98. Id. at 638.
99. Id. at 639 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating racial segregation in public schools required
by original state constitution).
101. See id. at 640 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding construction of schools served primar-
ily white zones and pupil assignments "preserved and augmented existing residential
segregation").
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established by law.102 In 1972, officials attributed the absence of a work-
able plan to the public's anti-desegregation sentiment.10 3 Consequent ju-
dicial intervention was prompted by what the trial court perceived as
"the unpardonable recalcitrance of the... Board." 104 Only three years
later, the Board moved to close the case on the grounds that it had elimi-
nated all vestiges of discrimination. In 1977, its motion was granted.10 5
The disagreement between the majority and the dissenters focused
not on whether an injunction should be dissolved when its purposes have
been achieved, but instead on what constitutes sufficient evidence of that
achievement. Because the Brown decision was centrally concerned with
stigmatic harm, the dissenters maintained that school boards were obli-
gated to avoid the recurrence of such injury. 106 It was their understand-
ing "that the effects of past discrimination remain chargeable to the
school district regardless of its lack of continued enforcement of segrega-
tion, and the remedial decree is required until those effects have been
finally eliminated."10 7
The dissenters would have displaced the challenged student assign-
ment plan because the history of state-sponsored segregation and persis-
tence of racially identifiable schools continued to radiate a message of
inferiority. 108 Minimizing the relevance of context, the Court discounted
the linkage between residential and school segregation. The majority in-
timated that judicial supervision was inapt if "residential segregation...
was the result of private decisionmaking and economics ... and [thus]
... too attenuated to be a vestige of former school segregation."' 109 Lost
in that relatively narrow focus was the historical reality that through the
1960s, the school board had used neighborhood schools to reinforce seg-
regated housing patterns.' 10 To regard present demographics as an ex-
clusive function of personal preference required conscious neglect of how
state and local action had contributed to "self-perpetuating patterns of
102. See id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (The school board "rationalized] its intransigence on
the constitutionally unsound basis that public opinion [was] opposed to any further
desegregation.").
104. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Dowell v. Board of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256,
1271 (W.D. Okla. 1972)).
105. See id. at 641 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 642 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to invest in standards that
"avoid[] the recurrence of... stigmatizing injury").
107. Id. at 644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 648 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing contested plan as a " 'vestige' of state-
sponsored segregation").
109. Id. at 638 n.2 (majority opinion).
110. Id. at 646 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting how school board's neighborhood schools
plan destroyed integrated neighborhoods and reinforced residential segregation).
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residential segregation."11 To the dissenters, the Court's decision to ter-
minate judicial interest without accounting for such realities suggested
that it was abandoning constitutional responsibility for ensuring that the
work of Brown was fully completed and that stigmatic injury would not
recur. 12 For the majority, however, the greater danger was the condem-
nation of school districts to "judicial tutelage for the indefinite future."113
The Dowell decision indicated that constitutional responsibilities de-
pended upon the causes of segregation and judicial monitoring was not to
be indefinite. A year later, in Freeman v. Pitts,114 the Court amplified its
account of what did and did not qualify as constitutionally significant
segregative factors and reiterated its view on the limited and finite ftmc-
tion of the judiciary. At issue in Freeman was the district court's deci-
sion that the school system in DeKalb County, Georgia had largely
achieved unitary status.11 5 Because the system had eliminated biracial
division with respect to student assignments, transportation, physical fa-
cilities, and extracurricular activities, the lower court ruled that it would
provide "no further relief" in those areas.116 It retained jurisdiction,
however, over faculty assignments and resource allocation on the
grounds that constitutional violations pertinent there to had not been sat-
isfactorily redressed.1 17 Upon review, the court of appeals reversed and
asserted that (1) the district court must exercise full remedial authority
until unitary status has been demonstrated for several years, and (2)
demographic changes complicating achievement of unitary status did not
diminish the duty of fully dismantling a biracial school system.118
While noting that it traditionally had required school districts to
"take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch,"'1 19 the
Supreme Court unanimously determined that achievement of a unitary
system was required only to the "extent practicable."12 Expounding
upon its reluctance to define "unitary" in concrete or absolute terms, the
Court noted that "[t]he term 'unitary' does not confine the discretion and
authority of the District Court in a way that departs from traditional
111. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 638 (majority opinion).
113. Id.
114. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
115. Id. at 1439.
116. Id. at 1442.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1443 (quoting Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968)).
120. Id at 1446 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991).
Springz 19931 THE FATAL ATTRACTION OF BROWN
666 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 20:649
equitable principles." '121 Considerations of flexibility and customized re-
sponse, which inspired the Brown Court's approach to undoing segrega-
tion,122 thus were adapted to excuse the judiciary's removal of itself from
that process. "[I]ncremental or partial withdrawal of... supervision and
control," which the district court proposed, was endorsed as an exercise
congruent with the premise that remedial attention may be no broader
than the wrong itself. 123
As depicted by the Court, "the ultimate objective" of remediation
was not desegregation as a lasting achievement, but the "return [of]
school districts to the control of local authorities."" Such reversion was
made contingent upon equitable considerations that include full and sat-
isfactory compliance with the decree, the need for further oversight to
assure compliance, and evidence of good faith commitment to satisfying
constitutional demands.1 25 Citing specifically to Dowell, the Court said
that the primary issues were" 'compli[ance] in good faith with the deseg-
regation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable.' "126
The Court found persuasive evidence of the school system's good
faith effort to conform to constitutional demands in the system's seven-
teen year record of "successes ... and its dedication to providing a qual-
ity education for all students." 27 Despite those efforts, unitary status
was achieved only briefly and proved elusive over the long run. After the
first year of desegregation, major demographic changes unsettled residen-
tial patterns and racial balance in the schools. 28 In accordance with
Dowell, the Court based its response to that reality on its understanding
of causation. As the Court put it:
[W]here resegregation is a product not of state action but of private
choices, it does not have constitutional implications. It is beyond
the authority and beyond the practical ability of the federal courts
to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and massive demo-
graphic shifts. To attempt such results would require ongoing and
never-ending supervision of schools districts simply because they
were once de jure segregated. Residential housing choices, and
their attendant effects on the racial composition of schools, present
an ever-changing pattern, one difficult to address through judicial
121. Id. at 1444.
122. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955).
123. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1446.
126. Id. (quoting Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991)).
127. Id. at 1450.
128. Id. at 1439, 1447-48.
remedies. 
129
The Court acknowledged that vestiges of racial discrimination "re-
main in our society and in our schools," but affirmed limits upon the
extent of constitutional responsibility. 130 It concluded that even if con-
temporary consequences of segregation are "subtle and intangible," they
still "must be so real that they have a causal link to the dejure violation
being remedied." '131 Population resettlement by itself was found to have
no "real and substantial relationship to a de jure violation." '132 As a
function of private demographics rather than state action, the Court de-
termined that persisting segregation was constitutionally insignificant
and not a basis for further judicial attention.133
Unlike the recalcitrant officials in Dowell, the school board in the
Freeman case had demonstrated an extensive history of efforts to achieve
a unitary system.134 Despite that point of factual distinction, the dissent-
ers' concern in Dowell relating to continuing stigmatic harm135 still seems
apt. The Court's emphasis upon education as a local function and its
interest in minimizing federal judicial oversight' 36 seems selective, espe-
cially when examined in a broader equal protection context. In deter-
mining that race-conscious affirmative action policies are at odds with
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has stressed the federal interest in
constitutional color-blindness.I37 Historically, as Freeman most recently
discloses, the primacy of state policy and interest has served equally well
to blunt the Fourteenth Amendment potential for racially significant
change.
Decisions before and after Brown have acknowledged society's racial
hierarchy,' 38 but have accommodated it for constitutional purposes. The
Brown Court fashioned doctrine that largely ignored or underestimated
the significance of the cultural factors it sought to contain. It may have
assumed that it could overcome resistance or indifference. Subsequent
jurisprudence and results have disclosed a fundamental miscalculation.





134. Id. at 1450. The absence of any dissent in Freeman may evince the impact of Justice
Marshall's resignation from the Court. It also represents completion of a line from unanimous
support for desegregation in 1954 to unanimous foreclosure of it in 1991.
135. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 642-44 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445.
137. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498-500 (1989).
138. See, e.g., id at 493 (noting society's "sorry history" of racial discrimination); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (upholding separate but equal doctrine as basis for main-
taining established societal order).
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The desegregation era commenced with a principle that responded to the
existence and consequences of racial discrimination and has waned with
results that are incomplete and fleeting. Addressing the reality and con-
sequences of discrimination and disadvantage thus remains a challenge,
rather than achievement, of the past four decades.
Ill. Desegregation and Assimilative Premises: The
Consequences of Miscalculation
As the nation courses into its third century and toward the centen-
nial of the separate but equal doctrine, desegregation has been consigned
to a unique but brief role in over 200 years of racially significant constitu-
tional law. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in response to the limiting princi-
ples prefacing the era's foreclosure, observed that "[d]esegregation is not
and was never expected to be an easy task." '39 The Brown Court itself
sensed some possibility that its transformation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment represented a perilous constitutional undertaking. Its invitation of
state and local participation in the framing of relief represented an effort
to defuse resistance that backfired."' Later insistence upon relief that
"works now" marked the desegregation mandate's peak assertiveness.141
Whether legal demands actually might have reshaped reality beyond
what was achieved is at least dubious, given the prevalence of tracking,
dual standards of discipline, and other race-dependent phenomena that
have internalized duality in formally desegregated environments.142 The
question, however, is largely academic. Given personnel turnover and
ideological change on the Court, its demand for effective desegregation
merely prefaced the circumscription and eventual demise of the Brown
mandate.
The prohibition of official segregation represents an irreversible
achievement of the Brown Court.143 As noted previously, 44 qualifying
139. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140. Dismantling of official segregation has not been fully achieved, as evidenced by the
persistence of racially identifiable schools throughout the nation including the region most
affected by the Brown mandate. Moreover, schools have become resegregated in some commu-
nities after the desegregation process has been completed. See, eg., Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at
1447-48, discussed supra notes 114-138 and accompanying text.
141. See Green v. County Sch. 3d., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1969).
142. See, e.g., Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 148 (5th Cir.
1972) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 397
(5th Cir. 1967) (Gewin, J., dissenting)).
143. After Brown, the Court summarily invalidated official segregation in public venues.
See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, reh'g denied, 358
U.S. 913 (1958) (parks); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches).
144. See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text.
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principles have precluded animation of the Fourteenth Amendment in
response to modem variants of discrimination that may be as effective
and even more insidious than their overt antecedents. Despite modem
consensus that official segregation was constitutionally inimical, and the
disengagement of Brown from contemporary realities of subtle or uncon-
scious racism, the decision continues to elicit criticism as an exercise in
judicial overreaching. Some detractors maintain that acceleration of the
law beyond the state of moral development of society, and beyond what
the political branches had provided, was an anti-democratic exercise des-
tined to fail and cause more damage than it repaired.145 Other critics
have been reluctant to challenge the premise of Brown, but have com-
plained about a methodology of review that they consider unprinci-
pled.146 Alternative theories for reaching the same result, however, are
notable primarily for their inadequacy. 147
The Brown decision as an exercise in constitutional jurisprudence is
defensible, even in arguably originalist terms. The evolution of public
education into a significant determinant of opportunity for material self-
development provided a legitimate nexus to the Framers' original con-
cerns and sufficiently justified the Court's redefinition of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Despite prolonged intransigence and reservations about
desegregation's potential reach, the citizenry as a whole, and even Court
decisions limiting the Brown mandate, have ratified the principle that of-
ficially prescribed segregation is not consonant with equal protection
under the Constitution. 4 ' If nothing else, the intellectual gymnastics of
theorists, still seeking to square the results of 1954 with pet precepts of
review, or to avoid a position that would undermine the marketability of
their general ideology of the judicial function, confirm widespread ac-
ceptance of the notion that official segregation is constitutionally offen-
sive. Still, the net result of the desegregation mandate, as qualified, has
reduced the Fourteenth Amendment to a demand for formal equality
that is largely irrelevant to modem racial circumstances. 149 Specifically,
modern constitutional standards leave undisturbed the subtle, disguised,
or unconscious discrimination that has supplanted overt prejudice and
145. See, eg., LINo A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE (1976).
146. Bork's theory that the Court could invest in the anti-discrimination principle as a
proper alternative to eviscerating the Fourteenth Amendment altogether. See BORK, supra
note 31, at 82-83, ignores the imperatives of original intent that he generally argues the judici-
ary must honor.
147. Wechsler's argument based on freedom of association can easily be turned against
compulsory racial mixing. Wechsler, supra note 47, at 34.
148. See, eg., Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1440 (1992).
149. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105,
1133-34 (1989).
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descends directly from it.'5 '
Seldom acknowledged in the undoing of desegregation require-
ments, and criticism thereof, is Brown's own contribution to racial stig-
matization. Such results are not surprising given certain misperceptions
and miscalculations by the Brown Court. Although recognizing that offi-
cial segregation connoted inferiority, the Court's understanding of harm
was somewhat misplaced. Implicit in its derogation of the separate but
equal doctrine was the sense that black children were psychologically
deprived by not having the opportunity to mix with white children. The
real source of injury in a society that prioritizes personal liberty, auton-
omy, and determination, however, was a policy that denied choice con-
cerning matters of self-development including where and with whom to
attend school. By wrongly assuming the source and nature of harm, the
Brown Court offered doctrine intimating that blacks needed whites to
obtain a proper education and thereby reinforced traditional assumptions
of racial superiority and inferiority. By concluding that racially separate
education was inherently unequal, without attention to circumstance or
alternative, it underestimated the abiding reality of racism that, until ad-
dressed, would undermine any constitutional principle or mandate. De-
mands for societal change, linking destigmatization and opportunity to
compulsory mixing, compromised not only the remedy, but its objective
as well.
Post-Brown case law has delimited the possibilities for desegregation
and diminished the predicates for constitutional attention to discrimina-
tory or segregative conditions. The Court in 1954 emphasized the Four-
teenth Amendment significance of official action that was racially
stigmatizing' and that impaired equal educational opportunity.5 2 The
attempt to remedy such action has been confounded by standards that
require proof of discriminatory purpose rather than consideration of in-
jury or persisting disadvantage.' 53 Despite well-established case law to
the effect that the Fourteenth Amendment requires elimination of dual
schools and attainment of unitary status, the Court now notes that "it is
a mistake to treat words such as 'dual' and 'unitary' as if they were actu-
ally found in the Constitution."' 5 4 The observation is technically accu-
rate, but it applies with equal force to discriminatory purpose standards
150. The nature and effect of subtle and unconscious racism are discussed in Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
151. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text.
154. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 636 (1991).
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that are selectively enshrined in modem equal protection analysis. 155 In
1954, the Court intimated that education was a liberty interest protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.156 Twenty years later, at the same time
the Court was limiting the reach of desegregation, it held that access to
education was not a fundamental right. 157 Except to the extent that
overt discrimination is provable, and notwithstanding claims of stigmatic
harm or linkage to a segregative past, the net result is prohibition of for-
mal segregation and discrimination but tolerance of their legacy and even
reversion to their functional likenesses.
The defensibility of Brown as a legitimate exercise of constitutional
review does not afford it immunity from criticism with respect to its wis-
dom and foresight. Taken by itself, Brown expanded dramatically the
national demands of constitutional equality. The ruling may have been a
catalyst for enforcement action by the political branches that for decades
had evinced limited interest in civil rights. 158 In 1957, President Eisen-
hower dispatched federal troops to enforce the desegregation mandate
despite his own reservations.'5 9 A decade after Brown, Congress enacted
comprehensive civil rights and voting rights legislation. The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination in employment, housing, public
accommodations and facilities, and in federally supported programs.'6 °
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 barred schemes and devices that excluded
minorities from the political system.161 Whether Congress would have
acted sooner or later, or more or less effectively, absent Brown, is entirely
speculative. What is certain is that, given widespread resistance to and
evasion of the Court's edict, it was not until Congress intervened with
appropriate legislation that substantial desegregative progress was real-
ized.1 62 It is equally evident that, soon after the Supreme Court fortified
the desegregation principle with demands for remedies that "work
155. Motive-based inquiry, for instance, has been rejected in the freedom of speech context
on grounds that the constitutional stakes there "are sufficiently high". See United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
156. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (stating that unreasonable federal interfer-
ence with educational opportunity constitutes "deprivation of... liberty").
157. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-37 (1973).
158. Typifying federal interest in the post-Reconstruction era was the Court's determina-
tion that relief from racially motivated deprivation of voting rights would be pointless. Giles v.
Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903).
159. Federal intervention was prompted when the Governor of Arkansas called up the
National Guard to preclude desegregation of a high school in Little Rock. See Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1958).
160. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-e.
161. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971a-p.
162. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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now, ' 163 it began announcing limiting principles that curbed and eventu-
ally eviscerated the Brown mandate. The federal interest in civil rights
waned, as it did a century ago, at the end of the Reconstruction era. The
post-Reconstruction Court expressed fears of developing a federally in-
spired "code of municipal law." 1 4 It consequently invalidated civil
rights legislation and deferred to official segregation. 165 Similarly, the
modem Court emphasizes that education is a normatively local function
and that the federal interest is essentially aberrational and transitory.
1 66
Given Brown's achievement in dispatching formal segregation, but
its subsequent limitations and failures, the ultimate question is whether
Brown rates as a success or failure. Doctrinal wisdom is ultimately a
function not only of the quality of the Court's analysis, but also of its
durability and acceptance. In enunciating the desegregation mandate as
the future wave of equal protection, the Brown Court was at an especially
significant disadvantage since mid-twentieth century society was on the
brink of extensive change that would complicate its implementation.
The Court could not have anticipated how increased personal mobility,
emerging transportation networks, and suburban development would fa-
cilitate the reconfiguration of community life and demographic patterns.
By the 1970s, such changes presented a substantially reconstituted Court
with the opportunity to distinguish current conditions from the relatively
static social order which was considered in 1954.167
Although the precise societal changes and the curtailment of doctri-
nal potential that ensued may have been unforeseeable, the Brown Court
legitimately may be second-guessed for its sensitivity to a historical rec-
ord characterized by sporadic and aborted attention to racial justice, vac-
illating concern with discrimination, competing priorities, and the risk
that such factors would influence future doctrinal development. It also is
subject to questions regarding its appreciation of deep seated racial an-
tagonism and discomfort, how such realities would foil efforts to equalize
educational opportunity, and how the dynamics of racial stigmatization
operate. The Brown Court assumed that a redefined equal protection
guarantee would account more effectively over the long run for interests
163. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
164. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (striking down the Civil Rights Act of
1875 as an impermissible federalized "code of municipal law").
165. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 547 (1896) (warning of the danger of extending the
federal interest under Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for "code of municipal law").
166. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 637 (1991), discussed supra at notes 90-113
and accompanying text.
167. Thus, the Court articulated the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation
which, as discussed supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text, is primarily a principle of
convenience.
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which had been slighted by its analytical predecessor. It recognized the
possibility of resistance to its mandate but took the chance that it could
make the new constitutional formula work. What the Court in 1954 ap-
parently did not anticipate was the relatively quick demise of the desegre-
gation mandate in a way that ensured "the same separate and inherently
unequal education in the future as... ha[s] been unconstitutionally af-
forded in the past." 6 ' Had it possessed the vision to foresee that resist-
ance, decreased interest, and diminished commitment would permit the
substitution of functional for formal segregation, the Court may not have
announced the desegregation decision as it did or when it did.'69 What
Brown thus may be primarily faulted for are too predictable conse-
quences of underachievement and backlash when the judiciary fast-for-
wards the law beyond the society's moral development or capacity. The
aftermath of Brown suggests that the nation was ready to disown formal
segregation but not prepared to accept broad-spectrum integration or
policies designed to rectify past injustice on a broad scale. Lost in doctri-
nal calculus now is any constitutional formula that might meaningfully
account for persisting group separation and disadvantage.
Even if not directly responsible for the actual glosses that cramped
development of its work, the Brown Court nonetheless assumed the risk
that the desegregation principle, like any jurisprudential precept, would
be distinguished, curtailed, or abandoned. Considering the desegregation
mandate in historical context, the prospects for an unhappy ending
should have seemed at least a distinct possibility. The history of the
Fourteenth Amendment is dominated by resistance to its goals and per-
version of its central meaning.170 Intransigence and evasion defined
southern reaction to the desegregation mandate; hostility to its possible
expansion characterized northern and western response to it. To some
extent, the Court factored in the possibility of societal opposition to de-
segregation, as evidenced by its efforts to involve state and local commu-
nities in framing and effectuating relief. What it seems not to have
anticipated was the long-term efficacy of resistance, as desegregation be-
came a determinative issue in national politics, and the potential for in-
168. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 782 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. Chief Justice Warren was concerned that, in enunciating the desegregation mandate,
the Court should have a united front. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPERCHIEF 87-90 (1983).
Some Justices expressed reservations that judicially mandated desegregation would be counter-
productive. Justice Clark, for instance, was willing to support a decision against segregation
provided it was "done carefully [as not to] do more harm than good" and was not a "fiat or
anything that looks like a fiat." Id. at 89. The consequences of Brown, over the years may
validate the pertinence of such reservations.
170. See supra notes 14, 80-81 and accompanying text.
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terpretive translation of the Brown mandate into a relatively short-lived
phenomenon.
Because such a response had been so historically typical,171 the
Brown Court also might be criticized for failing to establish a constitu-
tional safety net in the event the new doctrine failed. As it has devolved,
the desegregation mandate seldom demands real desegregation 17 2 and
has established no lasting obligation. 73 Its limited significance for mod-
em circumstances warrants attention to whether other alternatives might
have worked better under the conditions that largely foiled Brown's
potential.
One alternative to desegregation was enhanced attention to equali-
zation, a proposition forcefully urged by states where official segregation
was being challenged. To ward off the possibility of desegregation, states
affected by the Brown decision promised a more meaningful accounting
for the equality requirements of the separate but equal doctrine.174 The
Court already had noted that such a policy was limited in its potential,
because it could reckon only with tangible but not intangible inequali-
ties.175 Nearly four decades later, the Brown mandate has succeeded in
effectively addressing neither desegregation nor equality interests. Given
the indisputably racist premises of official segregation,176 elimination of
the separate but equal doctrine was unquestionably correct. As a singu-
lar remedy, however, desegregation afforded no effective relief in school
systems that were resistant to change and provided no methodology to
account for equalization in the event desegregation failed. To the extent
it suggested that dignity and esteem were dependent upon mixing with
whites, rather than a function of full opportunity and choice, the Brown
decision also displaced one stigmatizing assumption in favor of another.
In different but nonetheless pertinent circumstances, Justice Harlan
observed that animation of the Fourteenth Amendment requires close
171. See id.
172. The reality is most poignantly evident in urban areas where, as some Justices have
noted, students would not be in a segregated educational environment absent past segregative
acts and policies. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 799, 805-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 71-75, 97-98, 130-33 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950) (state pledged to equalize sepa-
rate education at all levels); Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 531 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (state
promised to upgrade separate but equal schools), rev'd sub nom. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
175. See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634 (noting that intangible factors such as faculty reputation,
alumni connections, institutional status and professional opportunities are "incapable of objec-
tive measurement").
176. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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attention to the nation's history and values.177 Careful consideration of
risks to the desegregation mandate's future, given the Fourteenth
Amendment's jurisprudential record, favored at least some means of
reckoning with societal traditions and tendencies that were certain not to
vanish or abate merely because constitutional doctrine changed. In de-
ciding upon remedial methodology, the Court invested in the dismantling
of dual school systems "with all deliberate speed."1 ' An alternative, re-
pudiated by the Court for two decades until allowing for a reversion to
functional segregation, was that desegregation did not necessarily require
integration.1 7 9 Such an option, advanced initially by southern courts in
response to the Brown mandate, accepted elimination of prescriptive ra-
cial separation but would have minimized judicial restructuring of the
established social order. 80 Given the intransigence that confronted the
desegregation mandate,' investment in the less demanding alternative
probably would not have accomplished less than what ultimately was
achieved. Meaningful desegregative progress was not realized until after
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed and significant leverage became
available for the federal government to compel compliance. 8 2 Soon
thereafter, the Court's relaxed Fourteenth Amendment standards limited
desegregation's potential and permitted resegregation. Still unrealized is
a durable constitutional means of reckoning with a persisting legacy of
discrimination, stigmatization, and impaired educational opportunity.
To the extent stigmatization is a function of racial separation, no
real difference exists with respect to whether segregation is characterized
as de jure or de facto. For a student attending a racially identifiable
school, as critics and some courts have noted, it makes no difference
what segregation's proximate cause is. 183 The distinction is more conve-
nient than principled, and does not obscure the reality of how modem
segregation is connected to an unconstitutional past. 84 The Court has
177. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
178. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
179. The notion that desegregation and integration were not coextensive was asserted in
Brggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (arguing that the Constitution, even if
forbidding official discrimination, "does not require integration").
180. See id.
181. See supra notes 19, 52-57 and accompanying text.
182. Congress eventually conditioned federal funding upon the undoing of segregated
schools and enabled the Department of Justice to initiate desegregation suits. See supra note
20 and accompanying text.
183. See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 1972) (en
bane) (quoting United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 397 (5th Cir.
1967) (Gewin, J., dissenting)).
184. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 640, 646 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). See also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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rejected the notion that modem segregation, as a consequence of what it
characterizes as private decision-making, is stigmatizing and constitu-
tionally significant.' The consequence is that modem disparities in ed-
ucational opportunity are subject neither to desegregation nor
equalization demands. Although the Brown Court did not prematurely
prohibit segregation, it too hastily may have forsaken the second half of
the separate but equal doctrine as a premise for post-desegregation
demands.
While the Brown Court may not be culpable for the gutting of its
work, it is chargeable with a misunderstanding of history and underesti-
mation of the possibility that future courts would be less amenable to-
ward the doctrinal development necessary to confront predictable
impediments to long-term realization of its goals. Within approximately
the same amount of time that it took for the desegregation mandate to
unwind in the face of established resistance and mounting public distress,
post-Reconstruction efforts to vitalize the Fourteenth Amendment also
had evaporated.'86 Given the vigorous defense of segregation and warn-
ings against invalidating the established order, clear signals existed that
history might repeat itself. For desegregation to have been successful,
the Court would have had to implement it as a pervasive, unqualified,
and lasting requirement. Even then, the Court would have had to as-
sume the risk of doctrinal and institutional irrelevancy experienced a
century ago when it upheld slavery in the face of deep division and resist-
ance. "' 7 In choosing desegregation as a means of actualizing the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court accepted the danger that subsequent
decisions would condition, limit, and largely negate it.
The Court possibly could have achieved more meaningful long-term
results and immediate relief by insisting upon desegregation, while mak-
ing the political branches primarily responsible for implementing it. The
reality was that the desegregation effort would have dissipated even
sooner if Congress had not joined in the pursuit of new constitutional
objectives. No incentive or leverage existed for meaningful change until
federal law authorized the Justice Department to commence desegrega-
tion suits and federal funds could be terminated for noncomplying school
systems.'88 Until then, challenges to the established order were a func-
tion of individualized and underfinanced litigative initiative. Given such
185. See Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637-38.
186. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was struck down by the Court fifteen years after the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
187. Resistance to, evasion, and eventual repudiation of the Court's endorsement of slavery
is detailed in FEHRENBACHER, supra note 6, at 417-18.
188. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
THE FATAL ATTRACTION OF BROWN
circumstances, the Court at least might have insisted successfully upon
enhanced quality of education during the transition from racially identifi-
able to unitary schools by capitalizing upon commitments to equalization
and acceptance of nonsegregation, if not actual integration. 18 9 The clash
over busing further evidenced such a possibility. The controversy was
characterized by passionate resistance to the methodology-even though
it was the only practicable means of achieving racially mixed schools-
coupled with a counteroffer by its opponents of a social investment in
quality education. Such a demand not only would have afforded some
relief, which delay and evasion had denied entirely to early litigants, but
would have set a floor for future doctrinal qualification or regression.
Even if it were to dismiss stigmatization arguments, modem review
might have retained and expanded constitutional requirements of equal
educational opportunity. If it had prohibited segregation but left the dis-
mantling process to the political branches of the government, the Court
inevitably would have been called upon to determine the constitutionality
of effectuating legislation.19 0 Instead, the Brown Court wound up in the
position of the Dred Scott Court a century ago which, in upholding slav-
ery, created rather than ratified policy and compounded rather than re-
solved the controversy. 9 ' By forbidding segregation but leaving its
undoing to the political process, the Court at least would have disarmed
detractors of the argument that its function was anti-democratic and thus
illegitimate. It also might not have sacrificed other premises for insisting
upon continuing attention to equal educational opportunity and reckon-
ing with racially identifiable disadvantage that persists in public educa-
tion. Nor would it have perpetuated the stigma regenerated by
assumptions that personal opportunity, development, and dignity are de-
pendent upon assimilation into and approval by the dominant culture.
The Brown decision presents a major challenge to critics who sup-
port its repudiation of official segregation, agree with its general aims,
and recognize that it was inspired by a constitutional wrong more
profound than any miscalculation in response. As the Court's mandate
189. See supra notes 179-182 and accompanying text.
190. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1963)
(rejecting challenge to desegregation guidelines and conditions for receiving federal funding).
191. Critics of the Dred Scott decision formulated various reasons why it should be ignored
and resisted. The Republican Party advanced the argument that the affirmance of slavery was
merely "obiter dicta" and thus entitled to no respect. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 6, at
339. Abraham Lincoln advanced the theory that even if the decision was fully binding on the
parties it did not become controlling until settled. Id. at 442-43. At least one northern state
court defied the Supreme Court in a subsequent case concerning fugitive slaves and prompted
an opinion emphasizing federal court immunity from state challenges. See Ableman v. Booth,
62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858) (Wisconsin).
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evolved, however, acceleration of the law beyond its moral base created a
disincentive for society to directly confront and meaningfully examine a
compounding legacy of racial discrimination. Achievement of formal
equality and insistence on constitutional colorblindness for all purposes
are the work of decisions that have elicited much public attention but not
necessarily extensive public reflection. The resultant imagery of judi-
cially defined standards implies that the business of the Fourteenth
Amendment, at least with respect to accounting for discrimination
against racial minorities, has been successfully completed. Such a conse-
quence is reminiscent of the conclusion a century ago that, despite histor-
ical disadvantage and a brief remedial interlude, victims of
discrimination must "cease[] to be the special favorite of the laws."' 92
That sense is as misplaced now as it was then, insofar as the work of the
Fourteenth Amendment remains unfinished. A dominant modem im-
pression, evidenced by the waning of the desegregation mandate and
resistance to affirmative action, seems to be that further efforts to account
for accumulated racial disadvantage are unwarranted and excessive.
Such a condition may owe to an appearance of achievement that sur-
passes actual progress but nonetheless defines popular understanding.
The tragedy of Brown may be that in attempting to advance both the law
and morality, it ended up retarding both.
IV. Conclusion
For its uniqueness and brevity, the desegregation interval is rich
with instruction. The defusing of the Brown mandate, from insistence
upon elimination of segregation "root and branch"'93 to allowance of its
regrowth or persistence, illustrates how radical constitutional redirection
was translated eventually into limited achievements conserving much of
the legacy it sought to change. Brown also demonstrates the risks of
recontouring constitutional law in anticipation of significant cultural pro-
gress without doctrinal insurance for unexpected consequences. Critical
response that excuses Brown from interpretive standards, vigorously
pressed in other areas of constitutional doctrine, demonstrates how race
continues to be a profoundly distorting factor in the law's development.
Even more poignant is how the Court, in attempting to defeat racial
stigma, contributed to it.
To expect more from the desegregation experience may disregard an
especially pertinent lesson of Brown and its progeny. The central point,
192. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
193. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
reinforced by two centuries of historical reality, is that the judiciary is
more likely to accommodate than contest racial hierarchy in the estab-
lished social order. Evidence of that tendency is gleaned not only from
endorsement of slavery,194 allowance of "[m]ere discriminations,"1 95 and
support for official segregation, 196 but also from the recent circumscrip-
tion of remedial policies calculated to repudiate and remedy an acknowl-
edged "sorry history."
' 197
In its early incarnation, the Brown decision heralded the possibility
of constitutional litigation as a cost-efficient methodology for effecting
social change. Standards that prohibit official segregation and formal
discrimination have made a meaningful contribution to the pool of
thoughts and ideas from which collective moral and legal principles
emerge. Long-term jurisprudential performance evidences that law is an
extension of moral development, however, and assumptions of a converse
relationship may result in expectations that are unrealistic, in part be-
cause the process diverts attention from the necessary groundwork for
real and lasting progress. The desegregation era's achievements are not
insignificant. Their place in the broader stream of history, however, is
notable also for relaxing anti-discrimination standards, g19 confounding
initiatives for reckoning with the nation's discriminatory legacy,199 and
transforming constitutional obligations into a policy option.2 °°
194. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407-09, 449-51 (1856).
195. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
196. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1896).
197. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989).
198. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
199. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (finding racially preferential policy accounting for societal
discrimination suspect and invalidating it pursuant to strict scrutiny).
200. Although school districts are not obligated to rectify persisting segregation or resegre-
gation which would be characterized as de facto, the Court has not foreclosed the possibility of
integration as a legislative policy choice.
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